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Referrer Policy: we measured 466 French public websites, 81% declare none

An open measurement of 600 French public domains: which ones declare a Referrer Policy, how many third-party domains their homepage calls, and what that means for the citizen who did not choose to be there.

By Eric Gerard · Editor · AnonymFlow7 min readPhoto: Pexels

A citizen who opens the website of their town hall did not choose to be exposed to anyone else. They came for a form, an opening time, a council minutes PDF. Yet the moment that homepage loads, their browser may quietly contact a handful of other companies, each of which receives their IP address and, depending on one header, the exact page they are reading.

That header is the Referrer Policy. We measured whether French public websites declare one, and how many third parties their homepage calls. Here is what 600 domains gave us.

What we measured, and on what

We took a systematic sample of 600 domains belonging to French public bodies, mostly town halls and local authorities, and issued one GET request per domain on 1 September 2026, with a user agent that names itself and links to the method. 466 answered over HTTPS. The 134 that did not respond are counted separately and excluded from every rate below, because a silent domain is not a compliant domain and it is not a failing one either.

For each responding homepage we recorded three facts:

  • the Referrer-Policy response header, and its value,
  • the number of distinct third-party domains the HTML asks the browser to fetch,
  • whether a cookie was set on that first request.

The four reserves, stated before the numbers

  1. This is the homepage, not the site. An internal form page may behave very differently.
  2. A third party is not a tracker. A font, a map or a video player is a third party. The count measures exposure, not intent.
  3. The count is a floor, never a total. We only see what the served HTML declares. Third parties injected later by JavaScript are invisible to this method.
  4. No conclusion about lawfulness can be drawn from this file. It describes what a page asks a browser to do, not what a controller has declared.

The result: 81% declare no Referrer Policy

Of the 466 responding sites, 88 declare a Referrer Policy and 378 do not. That is 19% against 81%.

What we foundCountShare of responding sites
Declares a Referrer-Policy8819%
Declares none37881%
Calls no third party at all10823%
Sets a cookie on the homepage12226%
Median number of third parties2

Among the 88 that do declare one, the distribution is reassuring: 49 use strict-origin-when-cross-origin, which is the modern sensible default, 16 use the older no-referrer-when-downgrade, and 13 use same-origin. Only four use unsafe-url, which sends the full URL to every third party including over plain HTTP.

The honest reading is that the absence of a header is not, on its own, a leak: current browsers already default to strict-origin-when-cross-origin. What the absence means is that the protection depends entirely on the visitor's browser rather than on a choice made by the public body. For a service that citizens cannot opt out of using, that difference is not cosmetic.

Third parties: a median of two, and a long tail

A concrete office facade in grey, shot diagonally, with tall dark windows between pale vertical pillars, and a small black surveillance camera bolted to the wall at the centre of the frame.
A concrete office facade in grey, shot diagonally, with tall dark windows between pale vertical pillars, and a small black surveillance camera bolted to the wall at the centre of the frame.

The photograph shows a modern administrative facade in grey concrete, lit from the side, with a single small surveillance camera fixed to the wall between two window bays. Nothing in the image is hidden, and nothing in it announces itself either.

108 sites (23%) call no third party at all from their homepage. That is the encouraging half of this dataset: a public homepage that depends on nobody is not a theoretical ideal, roughly one in four already does it.

The median is 2 third parties. The distribution then thins out quickly: 44 sites call 5, sixteen call 6, and four sites call 10 or 11.

The most frequently contacted operators across the sample:

Third partyPresent onShare of responding sites
googleapis.com19642%
gstatic.com10021%
googletagmanager.com7215%
google.com7215%
cloudflare.com6714%
hcaptcha.com347%

googleapis.com at 42% is almost entirely web fonts. It is the single most effective thing to change on this list, because a font can be self hosted in an afternoon and the visitor's IP then stops travelling. googletagmanager.com at 15% is a different matter, since a tag manager exists to load other things.

The two outliers, described carefully

The two highest counts in the sample, at 11 third parties each, are status pages on esante.gouv.fr subdomains, and they call doubleclick.net, ads-twitter.com and facebook.net. Two things must be said in the same breath. These are service status pages, not the health services themselves, and they appear to run on a third-party status platform whose own page template brings those tags along. That is an accurate description of what we measured and it is as far as the measurement lets us go.

What a visitor can actually do about it

Nothing on this list is under the visitor's control. You cannot make a town hall self host its fonts, and you did not choose to load the page that calls them. What you can change is what those third parties learn about you when the call happens: a VPN replaces the IP address that every one of those operators would otherwise record, on every site, including the ones that behave well.

That is a narrow benefit and worth stating narrowly. It does not stop the request, it does not remove the tag, and it does nothing about cookies you accept afterwards. It changes one field, the one that identifies your connection.

Hide the IP that every third party recordsA single homepage can hand your address to six separate operators. A VPN changes what they receive, on every site you visit, not just the ones you chose.

The data, open and repeatable

Both the dataset and the collection script are published so that anyone can rerun the measurement, extend the sample, or contradict the result. The script performs one request per domain, identifies itself, and writes one row per domain along with a summary file.

A single run is a snapshot, not a state. These figures describe 1 September 2026. If a public body self hosts its fonts next month, its row changes, and that is exactly what a repeatable method is for.

Frequently asked questions

What is a Referrer Policy, in one sentence? It is an HTTP response header telling the browser how much of the current URL to disclose when requesting something from another server.

Does a third-party domain mean a tracker? No. A font, a map and a video player are all third parties. The count measures exposure, not intent.

Are these sites breaking the law? We do not say that, and the data cannot support it. Lawfulness depends on purpose and on what the controller declared, which a single HTTP request cannot reveal.

Measured on 1 September 2026 by one GET request per domain, on the homepage only. 600 domains sampled, 466 responded. All rates are computed on responding domains. Commercial links carry rel="sponsored nofollow"; an affiliate commission may apply at no extra cost to you.

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Everything you need to know.

Frequently asked questions

What is a Referrer Policy, in one sentence?

It is an HTTP response header that tells the browser how much of the current URL to disclose when it requests something from another server. With no policy declared, most browsers now default to strict-origin-when-cross-origin, which sends only the origin across sites. That default is a browser behaviour, not a guarantee from the site, and it can be weakened by an explicit unsafe-url policy or by a page-level meta tag we did not measure.

Does a third-party domain mean a tracker?

No, and this is the reserve that matters most in our figures. A web font, a map tile, an accessibility widget and a video player are all third parties, and all legitimate. What our measurement counts is exposure, meaning how many separate operators receive the visitor's IP address when the homepage loads. It says nothing about intent, and nothing about lawfulness.

Are these 466 sites breaking the law?

We do not say that and the data cannot support it. Whether a given third-party call requires consent depends on its purpose, on what is stored on the device and on what the controller has declared. Those are legal questions that a single HTTP request cannot answer. The figures describe what a page asks the browser to do, nothing more.

Why is the third-party count a floor rather than a total?

We read only the HTML the server sends. A script that injects an advertising tag after the page loads in the browser is invisible to this method. So the real number of third parties contacted during a full visit is equal to or higher than what we publish, never lower.

Can I check my own site the same way?

Yes. The collection script is open source and takes a CSV of domains. It performs one GET per domain with a user agent that names itself, and it writes one row per domain plus a summary. Both the script and the dataset are published so the run can be repeated and contradicted.